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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction existed in the district court under Utah Code§ 78A-5-102(1). 
Appellate jurisdiction exists under Utah Code § 78A-4-l 03(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE No. 1: Evidence not considered in the district court cannot be considered on 
appeal. Chuck's appeal relies entirely on evidence that the district court deemed untimely 
and refused to consider. The court deemed the evidence untimely because it was available 
the day the lawsuit was filed but was not offered until six years after litigation began and 
nearly a year after trial. Can Chuck's appeal prevail where there is no evidence available 
on appeal to support it? 
Standard of Review for Issue No. 1: Challenges to standing are reviewed using 
the standard for a dispositive motion at the relevant stage of litigation.1 Legal 
determinations regarding standing are reviewed for correctness, but factual findings 
underlying jurisdictional issues are reviewed for clear error.2 In addition, jurisdiction is 
presumed after a judgment has been entered, and the burden of demonstrating a lack of 
-a jurisdiction lies with the party attacking jurisdiction. 3 
Preservation: Chuck's standing argument was not preserved. While standing is a 
jurisdictional issue that cannot be waived, for all intents and purposes Chuck waived this 
particular standing argument by failing to timely off er evidence to support it. Evidence 
supporting this argument was not offered until nearly a year after trial and the district 
1 Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14,115,228 P.3d 747. 
2 Miles v. Miles, 2011 UT App 359, ,I 6, 269 P.3d 958 (internal citations omitted). 
3 Id. 
court refused to consider it. 4 
In addition, Chuck did not preserve the majority of the remaining arguments he 
raises on appeal. In the lower court, Chuck requested relief from judgment under Rule 
60(b )( 4) through 60(b )( 6) only and based each corresponding argument on evidence that 
the court deemed untimely and refused to consider. All other arguments were not 
preserved. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
(l)(a) A person may not bring or maintain an action in any court of this state for 
the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation, for any act done or service rendered 
if the act or service is prohibited under this chapter. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(a), a person may bring or maintain an 
action in any court of this state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation if 
the person is: 
(i) a principal broker; 
(ii) an individual that was licensed as a principal broker at the time the act 
or service that is the subject of the lawsuit was performed; or 
(iii) an entity that, under the records of the Division of Real Estate, is 
affiliated with a principal broker. 
(2)(a) A sales agent or associate broker may not sue in that individual's own name 
for the recovery of a fee, commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or 
associate broker unless the action is against the principal broker with whom the sales 
agent or associate broker is or was affiliated. 
(b) An action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation may 
only be instituted and brought by the principal broker with whom a sales agent or 
associate broker is affiliated. 5 
4 See pp. 7-20, infra. 
5 Utah Code Ann.§ 61-2f-409 (2015). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATlJRE OF THE CASE, STATEMENT OF FACTS, AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal arises out of a real estate brokerage's attempt to collect a commission. 
The real estate brokerage consists of Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, Elite Legacy 
Corporation, and Skip Wing as their principal broker (this brief refers to these parties 
collectively as Aspenwood or the Aspen wood Plaintiffs). Aspenwood alleged that it 
entered into a For-Sale-By-Owner Commission Agreement with the defendants Still 
Standing Stable, LC, Chuck Schvaneveldt, and Cathy Code, and that Aspenwood earned 
a commission under that FSBO agreement. 
The real estate agent representing Aspen wood in the transaction was Tim Shea. 6 
At the time the FSBO was signed, Shea worked for Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, 
which was doing business as Remax Elite with Skip Wing as the principal broker. 7 
Aspenwood Real Estate later became Elite Legacy Corporation, which also did business 
as Remax Elite with Skip Wing as the principal broker.8 Skip has since retired,9 while 
Tim has moved to Colorado. 10 Both Aspenwood Real Estate and Elite Legacy have 
~ ceased operating and will conclude their winding up phase as soon as this litigation 
ends. I I 
6 E.g., R. at 8385, pp. 128:16-129:6, 175:18-24. 
7 R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 164:19-165:21, 183: 12-15; 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2. 
vJ 8 R. at 8384, pp. 164:19-165:26. 
9 R. at 8384, p. 164:13-18. 
10 R. at 8385, p. 86: 12-13. 
II See R. at 1092; 1483-85. 
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1.1 The commission claim's factual background 
In September, 1998, Still Standing bought a property located in Weber County 
(the Property). 12 Around early 2006, Chuck began making efforts to sell the Property. 13 A 
real estate agent working for Aspenwood, Tim Shea, approached Chuck with potential 
buyers for the Property. 14 
In February, 2006, Shea and Chuck entered into a For-Sale-By-Owner 
Commission Agreement. 15 Under that FSBO Agreement, Chuck agreed to pay a 
commission equal to 3 % of the purchase price if he accepted an off er to purchase the 
Property .16 Shea signed the FSBO as an agent of Remax Elite. 17 About two weeks later, 
Chuck signed a REPC and accepted an offer to purchase the Property. 18 
As the closing date approached, Chuck indicated that he would be providing a 
special warranty deed at closing, not a general warranty deed as required by the REPC. 19 
The special warranty deed would not guarantee access to the Property. 20 
After learning that Chuck would not fulfill his contractual obligation to provide a 
general warranty deed, the Buyer decided not to go through with the deal.21 Nevertheless, 
12 R. at 2900. 
13 R. at 8385, pp. 87:1-92:18. 
14 R. at 8385, pp. 92:2-95:13. 
15 Cathy Code signed the FSBO on Chuck's behalf, and the jury found that Chuck ratified 
that signature. R. at 5388-89. 
16 Id.,, 2. 
11 Id. 
18 Br. of Appellant, Ex. 2, § 25. 
19 R. at2913-15; 8385, pp. 135:17-136:19, 187:17-188:3. 
20 R. at 2913-15. 
21 Id. 
4 
Chuck attempted to complete the transaction by showing up at closing and signing the 
closing documents. 22 
1.2 The commission claim's procedural history 
In November, 2006, "Remax Elite" (a dba designation) filed a petition seeking 
declaratory relief regarding whether Remax Elite should deliver earnest money to the 
buyer or the seller after the failed real estate transaction. 23 Nearly two years later, Remax 
Elite asserted a claim against Still Standing, Chuck, and Cathy claiming that Remax had 
earned a commission under the FSBO.24 
The Defendants tenaciously opposed Remax' s capacity to sue them, claiming in at 
least eight pretrial motions that "Remax Elite," as nothing more than a dba designation, 
~ did not have standing to sue.25 Specifically, the Defendants argued that "Remax Elite" 
was an expired dba (thus violating the assumed-name statute/6 and that only Remax 
Elite's principal broker Skip Wing had standing to recover the commission.27 At one 
point, Chuck even submitted a summary judgment motion asserting as undisputed fact 
that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's principal broker and the only principal broker 
involved in the transaction. 28 
The Defendants' efforts to dismiss the case under their "expired dba" argument 
22 R. at 367. 
23 R. at 1-4. 
24 R. at 660-64. 
25 R.at 1256-83; 1407-62;2068-104;2120-36;2390-414;2548-53;2614-22;2653-60. 
26 E.g., R. at 2400-03. 
27 E.g., R. at 1256-83; 1407-62; 2068-104; 2120-36; 2390-414; 2548-53; 2614-22; 
2653-60. 
28 R. at 1408. 
5 
included investigating the Remax Elite dba's registration documents. For example, Chuck 
argued in a summary judgment motion and a motion requesting mediation that the FSBO 
commission claim should be dismissed due to expiration of the Remax Elite dba.29 To 
support his assertion that the dba had expired, Chuck attached corresponding registration 
documents he accessed from the Utah Department of Commerce. 30 
Eventually the "expired dba" argument and other motions regarding standing were 
resolved by adding the Aspenwood Plaintiffs (i.e., Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, 
Elite Legacy Corporation, and their principal broker Skip Wing).31 After Aspenwood was 
added, the Defendants abandoned their standing arguments voluntarily. 32 The case then 
proceeded to trial, where Aspenwood prevailed against Chuck while both Still Standing 
and Cathy were dismissed. 33 
After trial, the court turned to resolution of the parties' claims for attorney fees. 
During the dispute over attorney fees, Skip asserted that he was involved in the case as a 
representative only and therefore should not be personally liable for Cathy Code's award 
of attorney fees. 34 This included pointing out to the court that Skip had never signed the 
FSBO; Shea signed it on behalf of Remax Elite. 35 Because Skip was not a party to the 
FSBO, he asserted that he could not be personally liable under the FSBO's attorney-fee 
29 E.g., R. at 2123-24; 2400-03. 
30 R. at 1451; 2134-36; 2411-12. 
31 R. at 3591-604. 
32 R. at 7015. 
33 R. at 5423-25; 5388-89; 5613-14. 
34 R. at 6780-90. 
35 R. at 6783-86. 
6 
provision. 36 
In a complete surprise to Aspenwood~ pointing out the innocuous and obvious fact 
that Skip never signed the FSBO triggered over a year and a half of post-trial litigation. 
~ According to Chuck, this "admission~~ from Aspenwood somehow spurred him to 
investigate who owned the Remax Elite dba,37 despite the fact that the dba's status had 
"vexed the entire litigation"38 and Chuck had already looked up the dba's registration 
documents nearly three and a half years earlier. 39 
1.3 The flood of post-trial Quinlan motions 
Chuck's belated inquiry into the registration documents convinced him that Dale 
Quinlan was somehow involved in the failed real estate transaction. 40 Thus ten months 
\i1 after the trial ended Chuck submitted a motion to dismiss based on this previously 
unreferenced Quinlan evidence.41 Chuck suggested that Quinlan had owned the Remax 
. Elite dba at the time Chuck signed the FSBO, and therefore Chuck was somehow 
contracting with Quinlan rather than Aspenwood. 42 The district court responded to this 
motion harshly: "This is precisely the type of cumulative and unnessary [sic] motion that 
~ justified the significant attorney fees awarded in this case, and caused this case to 
languish on the court's docket for years."43 
36 Id. 
37 Br. of Appellant, 8-9. 
38 Id., 9. 
39 R. at 1451; 2134-36; 2400-03; 2411-12. 
40 R. at 6867-72. 
41 R. at 6864-66 
42 R. at 6867-72. 
43 R. at 7012. Addendum, Ex. A. 
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This motion turned out to be the first of several "cumulative and unnecessary" 
motions based on the Quinlan evidence. In the end, Chuck filed six post-trial motions-
each relying on nearly identical '~facts'~ and legal arguments. 44 Chuck pursued these 
motions one after another under every conceivably applicable rule of civil procedure. 
Resolving them took a year and a half. 45 
While this appeal concerns only the fourth of these six motions, the resolution of 
all six motions matters here, for two reasons:: 1) the Court refused in each instance to 
admit the Quinlan evidence, making that evidence unavailable for appeal; and 2) the 
order that Chuck appeals relied on rulings and findings in the previous post-trial orders. 
1.3.1 The first post-trial Quinlan motion 
Chuck's first post-trial motion claimed that the new Quinlan evidence showed that 
Quinlan had originally owned the Remax Elite dba. 46 According to Chuck, this somehow 
made Quinlan Remax Elite's principal broker and the only party entitled to seek the 
FSBO commission.47 
The district court absolutely refused to consider the untimely Quinlan evidence: 
"Raising this question of fact concerning the standing of the plaintiffs at this late date is 
unwarranted .... Raising new factual issues nearly a year after a jury trial and six months 
after entry of judgment will not be permitted."48 
44 R.at6864-66;6987-93;7088-90;7287-93;7876-91;8110-22. 
45 The first Quinlan motion was filed on June 28, 2013 (R. at 6864-66) and the final 
Quinlan motion was resolved in an order entered December 29, 2014 (R. at 8452-54). 
46 R. at 6867. 
47 R. at 6869-71. 
48 R. at 7013. Ex. A. 
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In reaching its decision, the court faulted Chuck for failing to explain why he had 
failed to discover the Quinlan evidence earlier: '~Even if this motion were timely, [Chuck] 
has provided no explanation for why this new evidence could not have been discovered in 
vP time for a Rule 59 motion."49 In addition-and making Chuck's burden on appeal much 
more difficult to overcome-the court made this critical factual finding: "It is beyond 
belief that [Chuck] could not have discovered this evidence with due diligence."50 
And the court did not stop there. It also noted that even if the Quinlan evidence 
were considered, that evidence was irrelevant: Skip Wing, not Dale Quinlan, was the 
principal broker associated with the FSB0.51 Further, the court found that both 
Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation and Elite Legacy Corporation owned the Remax 
~ Elite dba.52 Finally, the court ruled that Chuck had waived his allegations of forgery and 
fraud because he had failed to raise them earlier in the litigation. 53 
·· Based on its refusal to consider the new evidence and its other findings and 
rulings, the court denied the motion. 54 The court concluded its order by stating "The court 
is satisfied that this case is closed. "55 Chuck has not appealed any ruling associated with 
viP this first motion. 
1.3.2 The second post-trial Quinlan motion 
Three weeks after Chuck filed his first post-trial motion to dismiss, Chuck and 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 R. at 7013-14. Ex. A. 
52 R. at 7015. Ex. A. 
53 R. at 7014. Ex. A. 
54 R. at 7016. Ex. A. 
55 R. at 7017. Ex. A. 
9 
Still Standing filed a second motion to dismiss based on a purported settlement 
agreement. 56 This motion claimed that Quinlan and the Defendants had reached a 
settlement agreement regarding the FSBO commission.57 
Again, the district court absolutely refused to consider the Quinlan evidence: 
[T]his court cannot consider new evidence from Defendants after a final judgment ... 
. "
58 Moreover, the court found that Chuck once again had failed to explain why he could 
not have discovered the Quinlan evidence earlier.5~ The court called this failure a "fatal 
flaw" to considering the Quinlan evidence. 60 
For these two reasons, the court denied the motion. 61 In addition, the court denied 
the motion on the ground that the purported settlement claim did not mandate dismissal: 
[E]ven if this motion were not time barred and Defendants did have some 
reasonable excuse why they could not discover this new evidence earlier, 
settling a claim that could be raised by a third party does not per se indicate 
that the plaintiffs in this case did not have standing to assert their claims. At 
best the new evidence would raise a material question of fact concerning 
proper ownership of the commission claim.62 
This order, like the first order dealing with Quinlan issues, concluded by stating 
"The court is satisfied that this case is closed. "63 Chuck has not appealed any ruling 
associated with this second motion. 
56 R. at 6987-93. 
51 Id. 
58 R. at 7147. 






1.3.3 The third post-trial Quinlan motion 
Three weeks after filing the second motion, Chuck submitted a third motion based 
on the Quinlan evidence.64 In this third motion, Chuck asked the court under Rule 52 to 
amend the findings in the final judgment, asserting that the judgment should be revised to 
reflect that Dale Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba and was therefore the contracting 
party in the FSBO. 65 
-L l response, the district court refused a third time to consider the Quinlan 
evidence: "[T]he Court's ruling is that there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new 
evidence. "66 In reaching its conclusion, the court found-for the third time-that Chuck 
could have discovered the Quinlan evidence with due diligence: 
[T]he information, specifically the documentation from the Department of 
Corporations, and ... challenges with respect to the validity or invalidity of 
signatures, and whether or not they're forged or have been cut and pasted, 
all of those kinds of things were information that could, by reasonable 
diligence, have been discovered and determined well before a trial was 
conducted in this case. 67 
Once again, the court did not simply dismiss the motion based on exclusion of the 
Quinlan evidence and Chuck's lack of diligence. Here, the court also pointed out that 
even if the Quinlan evidence were considered, the court was required to construe that 
evidence in favor of the judgment. 68 Indeed, the court proceeded to rule on this issue, 
stating that it construed the evidence in a way that supported the judgment: considering 
64 R. at 7088-90. 
65 R. at 7093-104. 
66 R. at 8238. Addendum, Ex. C. 
67 R. at 8237. Ex. C. 
68 R. at 823 8--42. Ex. C. 
11 
all the evidence, Quinlan was an employee and agent for the plaintiff corporations and 
Quinlan's involvement with the dba was limited to his capacity as an employee or 
representative of the true owners, the business entities. 69 Chuck has not appealed any 
ruling associated with this third motion. 
1.3.4 The fourth post-trial Quinlan motion (Rule 60(b )) 
One month after submitting the third motion, Chuck submitted a fourth motion, 
this time requesting relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). 70 This is the motion before 
the Court on appeal. Here Chuck asserted that Dale Quinlan, as the purported owner of 
the Remax Elite dba, was the only party entitled to pursue the FSBO commission; 
therefore the plaintiffs never had standing to pursue the commission claim and the claim 
had been settled between Quinlan and the Defendants.71 
Chuck's argument focused on Rule 60(b) subsections 4 through 6.72 While the 
motion itself states that it requests relief under subsections two through six, 73 Chuck's 
supporting memorandum provided analysis and argument regarding subsections four 
through six only. 74 Indeed, the court expressly noted in both its oral ruling and written 
order that Chuck did not request relief under 60(b )(2), the subsection allowing relief 
based on newly discovered evidence. 75 In addition, because Chuck did not raise Rule 
60(b )(3) as a ground for relief the district court did not address Rule 60(b )(3) in its oral 
69 R. at 8241--42. Ex. C. 
70 R. at 7287-94. 
71 R. at 7311-18. 
72 R. at 7314-19; 8256. 
73 R. at 7291-92. 
74 R. at 7314-19. 
75 R. at 8255-56; 8446 pp. 46:24--47:16. 
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ruling or written order.76 
In his supporting memorandum, Chuck acknowledged that the court had earlier 
excluded the corresponding Quinlan evidence based on timeliness, stating that he filed 
this motion "to put the facts and law squarely before the Court for a ruling on the 
record."77 Chuck claimed this motion was timely for three reasons. First, Chuck stressed 
that he had filed the Rule 60 motion within three months of the final judgment, which 
would make the motion timely under subsections (1) through (3 ). 78 Second, Chuck 
claimed (without elaboration) that the motion was brought within a reasonable time 
because he had exercised due diligence throughout discovery. 79 Third, Chuck blamed 
Aspen wood for his failure to learn of Quinlan's purportedly critical involvement with the 
FSB0.80 
Notably, Chuck provided no legal argument, analysis, or citation to authority 
regarding whether Aspen wood's allegedly fraudulent acts justified relief from judgment 
under Rule 60(b)(3).81 Instead, Chuck raised these issues solely to establish that his 
motion was timely and properly before the court. 82 
After arguing that the motion was properly before the court, Chuck then requested 
relief from the judgment under 60(b )( 5), asserting that the judgment against him had been 
76 R. at 8254-69; 8446 pp. 45:6-58:5. 
77 R. at 7294. 
78 R. at 7311-13. 





satisfied.83 Chuck's analysis on this point was less than clear, but his argument boiled 
down to this: 
• Dale Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba at the time the FSBO was signed, 
therefore Quinlan was Remax Elite and the "true party to the FSBO." 
• The FSBO requires Remax Elite (i.e., Quinlan) to mediate before 
proceeding to litigation. 
• Quinlan mediated with the Defendants and settled his purported right to the 
comm1ss1on. 
• Because the party that was truly entitled to the commission claim (Quinlan) 
settled that claim, the judgment had been satisfied. 84 
Next Chuck requested relief from the judgment under 60(b)(4) because 
Aspenwood had allegedly failed to prove that it had standing.85 This argument was 
essentially identical to Chuck's argument under 60(b)(5): 
• Dale Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba at the time the FSBO was signed, 
therefore Quinlan was the "only Remax contracting party when the FSBO 
was signed." 
• Because Quinlan was "the only Remax contracting party," only Quinlan 
had the right under the FSBO to pursue a commission. 
• Quinlan never transferred his ownership of the dba or the commission 
claim to Aspenwood, and documents purporting to transfer the dba were 
fraudulent. 
• Because only Quinlan had the right to pursue the commission and never 
transferred that right to Aspenwood, Aspenwood did not have standing to 
th · · 86 
83 R. at 7314. 
84 Id. 
pursue e comm1ss1on. 
85 R. at 7315-18. 
86 Id. 
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Finally, Chuck turned to Rule 60(b )( 6), the rule's catch-all provision. 87 Once 
again, Chuck's argument here was somewhat hard to follow. But Chuck's first point 
under 60(b )( 6) apparently did not request relief from the commission judgment at all, but 
concerned earlier rulings dismissing Chuck's claims against the real estate agent Tim 
Shea: "Seller's side should be allowed to supplement earlier motions with testimony from 
Dale Quinlan to explain why Seller's side was damaged by the conduct of an incompetent 
agent and broker .... Dale Quinlan could testify regarding the duties of the agent. "88-
Chuck' s second (and final) point under 60(b)(6) mostly repeated his earlier 
arguments: 
• Quinlan-not Aspenwood-was the true FSBO contracting party. 
• The FSBO required the parties to mediate before going to court. 
• Quinlan never participated in mediation. 
• As a result, the mediation provision had never been complied with. 
• This violation of the mediation provision required dismissal of 
Aspenwood's claim.89 
Thus, while Chuck's motion mentioned 60(b)(2) (new evidence) and (3) (fraud), 
as grounds for relief, Chuck's supporting memorandum provided no supporting legal 
authority, legal argument, or analysis concerning why he was entitled to relief under 
these subsections. 90 And while Chuck did provide some legal argument under subsections 
four through six, those arguments were essentially identical, each presupposing that the 
~ 87 R. at 7318-19. 
88 R. at 7318. 
89 R. at 7319. 
90 R. at 7310-20. 
15 
Quinlan evidence was admitted, that the Quinlan evidence was undisputed, and that the 
Quinlan evidence somehow established Quinlan as a party to the FSBO and the true 
claimholder. 91 
The Quinlan evidence that Chuck offered to support his 60(b) motion consisted of 
four exhibits containing these documents: 
• an affidavit from Quinlan statin~ that he had never transferred his rights 
under the FSBO to Aspenwood; 2 
• a purported settlement agreement between Quinlan and the Defendants 
settling the FSBO commission claim;93 
• an "Expert Forgery Report" (offered years after the expert discovery 
deadline) purporting to establish that Quinlan's transfer of the Remax Elite 
dba to Aspenwood was based on forged signatures;94 and 
• a letter from the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code dated 
December 11, 2013 (filed after briefing as a "Supplemental Exhibit"), 
stating that the ownership of the Remax Elite dba has been returned to Dale 
Quinlan.95 
Aspenwood responded to this fourth attempt to introduce the Quinlan evidence by 
arguing that the motion could be resolved entirely under 60(b )(2), i.e., the subsection 
allowing relief based on new evidence that could not have been discovered earlier with 
due diligence. 96 Where Chuck's entire argument rested on the new Quinlan evidence, 
Chuck's motion could prevail only under 60(b )(2).97 
91 R. at 7314-20. 
92 R. at 7327-31. 
93 R. at 7322-25. 
94 R. at 7333-51. 
95 R. at 7731-37. 
96 R. at 7454-57. 
91 Id. 
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Aspenwood also argued that the Quinlan evidence should not be considered 
because Chuck did not exercise due diligence searching for the Quinlan evidence. 98 
Chuck had approximately six years to conduct discovery before trial. 99 The documents 
showing Quinlan's involvement with the Remax Elite dba were a matter of public record, 
and could have been discovered the day the lawsuit was filed. 100 Aspenwood also pointed 
out that Chuck had failed to identify what steps he had taken to acquire the Quinlan 
evidence before trial ai1d how those steps amounted to due diligence. 101 Finally, 
Aspenwood noted that the district court had already found-more than once-that Chuck 
could have discovered the Quinlan evidence with due diligence. 102 
In addition to its argument under 60(b )(2), Aspenwood argued that under the 
" principal-broker statute, only the principal broker associated with a sales agent has 
statutory standing to pursue a commission claim on the agent's behalf. 103 In this case, all 
testimony-before, during, and after trial-showed that Aspenwood was the principal 
broker associated with the real estate agent Tim Shea. 104 
Aspen wood also provided testimony and documents refuting Chuck's fraud 
allegations. 105 This evidence showed that Quinlan never had any right to the Remax Elite 
dba, that Quinlan ceased functioning as Aspen wood's principal broker seven months 





103 R. at 7465-67. 
104 Id. 
105 R. at 7494-96; 7996-8033. 
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before the FSBO was signed, that Quinlan had left the company roughly 17 months 
before the interpleader action was amended to add the FSBO commission claim, and that 
the Remax Elite dba had been registered in the name of Aspenwood Real Estate 
Corporation and Elite Legacy Corporation. 106 
The court denied Chuck's motion and refused to consider the Quinlan evidence, 
just as it had the previous three times: 
L .The Court's observation9fthis case, from the review of the proceedings up 
to the point of trial and then during the post-trial process, is that this issue 
of Mr. Quinlan's ownership of the dba, and his derivative right therefore to 
effectively control these claims or to transfer them, assign them, or 
compromise them, is a construct, all of which has occurred after trial. ... 
None of those issues have ever been presented on an evidentiary basis to 
the Court, and the Court, in light of both the timing of its presentation, the 
fact that Mr. Quinlan's involvement, both in the business entity and in the 
registration of the dba, is a matter of public record that has existed for many 
years, and questions that the Court has raised with respect to these 
documents, the Court will simply not countenance the legal argument that 
Mr. Quinlan is effectively the superseding entity with respect to these 
claims, and that argument is not given further legal consideration by the 
Court. 107 
1.3.5 The fifth post-trial Quinlan motion 
Over eight months after filing the fourth Quinlan motion, Chuck and Still Standing 
together filed a "Stipulated" Motion to Release Bond. 108 This motion asserted that Still 
Standing was the assignee, through Dale Quinlan, of all rights under the FSBO, including 
the right to pursue the FSBO commission claim. 109 As the purported sole owner of the 
FSBO commission claims, Still Standing and Chuck had reached a "stipulated" 
106 R. at 7996-8033. 
107 R. at 8264-65 ( emphasis added). Addendum, Ex. D. 
108 R. at 7876-90. 
109 Id. 
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agreement to release Chuck's supersedeas bond. 110 To support this argument, the motion 
relied on the already-rejected Quinlan evidence and offered that evidence as undisputed 
fact.111 
Unsurprisingly, the court denied the motion and refused to consider the Quinlan 
evidence: 
There have been significant steps taken by the defendant in this case 
to construct an alternative set of facts which would give Mr. Quinlan 
certain rights under this judgment and purport to assign those rights to him. 
None of those have been established properly by the Court, and the findings 
which were previously made by the Court as to the holders of the claim 
remain undisturbed. And therefore, Mr. Quinlan does not have authority to 
act on behalf of the holders of the claim, based upon the Court's denying 
the request to modify the prior rulings, and therefore is not a proper party 
with authority to stipulate on issues relating to the bond or any other 
disposition of the claim. And so that motion is denied. 112 
1.3.6 The sixth post-trial Quinlan motion 
One last attempt was made to introduce the Quinlan evidence, this time by Still 
Vii Standing. In this sixth attempt, Still Standing moved the court to substitute Still Standing 
as the plaintiff and "true claimholder" under Rule 25. 113 Still Standing filed this motion 
despite an order from the court entered two days earlier stating that the court would not 
consider any "alternative set of facts" under which Quinlan might have rights to the 
judgment in this case, including the capacity to assign rights to others. 114 




. at 8245. Addendum, Ex. E. 
113 R. at 8112. 
114 R. at 8245. 
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Defendants' Rule 25(c) motion raises an issue essentially identical to an 
issue that the Defendants have raised previously, i.e. the claim that Still 
Standing Stables, as the asserted current owner of the dba "Remax Elite," 
either by assignment from Dale Quinlan or by separate administrative 
determination by the Department of Corporations, owns the right to control 
the judgment in this case. In past hearings, the court has ruled that the 
evidence and arguments supporting these assertions of Still Standing 
Stables were not timely brought in this case and are not now profierly 
before the court. The court declines to modify its earlier rulings. 15 
In short, the district court has never departed from its original ruling on the 
Quinlan.evidence: the evidence is untimely and has never been properly before the court. 
1.4 Quinlan's actual involvement with the case and the dba 
Aspenwood maintains that no evidence concerning Quinlan was admitted below 
and therefore cannot be considered here. In addition, Aspenwood notes that Chuck failed 
to marshal any evidence contradicting his Quinlan claims. Aspenwood provides that 
evidence here, which Aspenwood offered in opposition to the 60(b) motion. 116 But 
Aspenwood does not abandon its position that no evidence regarding Quinlan should be 
considered on appeal and that Chuck's argument fails because he did not marshal any 
evidence supporting the findings below. 
In May 2003, a group including Skip Wing, Shane Thorpe, and Dale Quinlan 
established Aspenwood Real Estate, LLC, (Aspenwood LLC) a real estate company. 117 
Later, sometime in 2004, Aspenwood LLC entered into a franchise agreement with 
Remax International and received the right to conduct business under the name "Remax 
115 R. at 8453-54 (emphasis added). Addendum, Ex. F. 
116 R. at 7494-96; 7996-8033. 
117 R. at 7997. 
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Elite."118 Aspenwood LLC assigned Quinlan-in his capacity as an Aspenwood LLC 
employee-to register this dba in the company's name. 119 Quinlan registered the dba, but 
mistakenly listed himself, rather than Aspenwood LLC, as the dba's owner. 120 
Five months later, in May, 2005, Aspenwood LLC converted to Aspenwood Real 
Estate Corporation, one of the plaintiffs in this case. 121 At the time of the conversion, 
Quinlan was serving as Aspenwood's principal broker. 122 Just one month later, however, 
Quinlan stepped down as principal broker and became Aspen wood's corporate 
secretary. 123 Skip Wing replaced Quinlan as Aspenwood's principal broker. 124 Shortly 
after Quinlan ceased serving as Aspenwood' s principal broker, Quinlan lost his broker's 
license. 125 Although Quinlan no longer had a broker license, he continued working for 
\JP Aspenwood as a real estate agent. 126 This switch from Quinlan to Skip as principal broker 
occurred roughly eight months before the FSBO and REPC at issue were signed. 127 
Quinlan's loss of his broker's license occurred roughly seven months before the FSBO 
and REPC at issue were signed.128 
A few months after Quinlan shifted from principal broker to corporate secretary, 
118 See R. at 7999-8000. 
119 R. at 8000. 
120 Id. 
121 R. at 7997-98. 
122 Id. 
123 R. at 7998, f~ 10-11. 
124 Id 
125 Id. 
126 Skip became the principal broker in June 2005, the FSBO and REPC were signed in or 
around February 2006. 
127 Quinlan lost his broker's license in July 2005, the FSBO and REPC were signed in or 
around February 2006. 
128 R. at 8000, ,r 18. 
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Aspenwood negotiated with Remax International to establish a new Rem~-x franchise in 
South Ogden. 129 During the due diligence process, Remax International discovered that 
the Remax Elite dba had been registered in Quinlan's name. 130 Remax International 
required that this mistake be corrected before it would agree to authorize another Remax 
franchise. 131 
To correct the mistake, Aspenwood gave Quinlan, in his capacity as corporate 
secretary, the assignment to fix the incorrect registration. 132 Quinlan attempted to do s0 
by sending a letter to the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code (DCCC). 133 In 
his letter, Quinlan asked DCCC to transfer ownership of Aspenwood Real Estate 
Corporation itself to Shane Thorpe, stating that "Aspenwood Real Estate is DBA 
RE/MAX ELITE. " 134 The letter was ineffective because it attempted to transfer 
ownership of Aspenwood Real Estate, not ownership of the Remax Elite dba. 
So Quinlan sent a second letter. 135 This letter got it right, instructing DCCC to 
transfer the Remax Elite dba from Quinlan to Aspenwood Real Estate.136 In this letter, 
Quinlan stated that "RE/MAX Elite is the DBA for Aspenwood Real Estate Corp."137 




132 R. at 8001-02. 
133 Id. 
134 R. at 8001; 8028. 




Aspenwood Real Estate's name on :tvfarch 9, 2006. 138 This transfer occurred roughly one 
month after the FSBO and REPC at issue were signed. After the transfer was complete, 
Remax International authorized Aspenwood to establish a new Remax franchise in 
addition to Remax Elite. 139 
In December of that year, one month after this case was first filed as an 
interpleader, Quinlan sold his ownership interest in the company. 140 Although Quinlan 
was no longer an owner, he continued to work for Aspenwood as a ground-level real 
estate agent. 141 One month after Quinlan sold his ownership interest in Aspenwood, the 
Remax Elite name was transferred one more time, this time by Aspenwood Real Estate to 
Elite Legacy Corporation, another plaintiff in this action. 142 
Three months after that, Quinlan left his agent position with Aspenwood. 143 From 
that time on, Quinlan had nothing to do with Aspenwood Real Estate or Elite Legacy. 144 
He took no files or clients with him. 145 He also never claimed-until a year after the trial 
in this case-that he had a right to the Remax Elite dba. 146 And he has yet to claim an 
interest in any of Aspenwood's many other commissions earned under the name Remax 
Elite. 
138 R. at 7734. 
139 R. at 8001. 
140 R. at 7999. 
141 Id. 
142 R. at 8032. 





1.5 Skip Wing, the principal broker actually associated with the FSBO 
In contrast to the untimely, post-trial Quinlan evidence, the evidence produced at 
trial established that Skip Wing was the principal broker associated with the failed real 
estate transaction and that Skip's real estate brokerages owned the Remax Elite dba. 
Evidence of this was admitted without objection at trial, where Skip Wing testified that 
he was Remax Elite's principal broker147 and that the Remax Elite dba belonged to his 
brokerages (the plaintiffa Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation and Elite Legacy 
Corporation). 148 In addition, Tim Shea (the real estate agent who signed the FSBO) 
testified at trial that he worked for Remax Elite and that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's 
principal broker. 149 
In contrast, no party attempted to introduce evidence at trial showing that 
Aspenwood did not own the Remax Elite dba, that the Remax Elite dba was not properly 
registered, or that Skip Wing was not the principal broker associated with Tim Shea. 
Indeed, Chuck's own counsel throughout trial constantly referred to Remax Elite and the 
Aspenwood Plaintiffs interchangeably, including referring to Skip Wing as Remax Elite's 
principal broker. 150 At one point Chuck's counsel even proposed a jury instruction that 
referred to Skip Wing as Remax Elite's broker. 151 
147 R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 183: 12-15. 
148 R. at 8384, pp. 164:19-165:21; see also R. at 8384, p. 172:5-12. 
149 R. at 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2. 
150 E.g., R. at 8384, 149: 24-150:5, 153:5-12, 172:5-7, 174:3-9, 178: 12-13; 8385, pp. 
64:16-19, 65:22-66:1; 8387, pp. 78:16-79:5, 82:12-18, 83:2-6, 91:22-92:4, 92:14-16. 
151 R. at 8384, p. 67:8-19. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Chuck's arguments fail on threshold grounds. 
Chuck's standing argument fails because there is no evidence available on appeal 
to support it and Chuck has not appealed the exclusion of that evidence. Chuck's 
remaining arguments fail because Chuck failed to raise them below. 
II. Aspenwood has standing. 
At this stage of litigation, Chuck may establish that Aspenwood does not have 
standing only if no evidence exists to support Aspenwood's standing. Evidence was 
introduced at trial showing that Skip Wing was the proper principal broker to bring the 
claim and that the plaintiffs were operating under the properly registered Remax Elite 
~ dba. No conflicting evidence was offered until nearly a year after trial, and the district 
court deemed the evidence untimely and refused to consider it. As a result, substantial 
evidence establishes that Aspenwood has standing, no conflicting evidence exists, and 
Chuck's standing argument fails. 
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 60(b) motion. 
Chuck's arguments for relief under Rule 60(b) are merely extensions of his 
standing argument. Like the standing argument, these arguments fail because there is no 
evidence available to support them. And even if the Quinlan evidence is considered, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion for three reasons: 1) the Quinlan evidence is 
irrelevant-Aspenwood has statutory standing even if Quinlan owned the dba; 2) 
evidence regarding Quinlan must be evaluated in the light most favorable to Aspenwood, 
and the evidence establishes that Quinlan had no right to the Remax Elite dba and had no 
25 
involvement in this case whatsoever; and 3) at best, the Quinlan evidence establishes only 
that the FSBO parties acted under the mistake of fact that Aspenwood owned the Remax 
Elite dba. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Chuck's appeal fails on threshold grounds. 
A. The Quinlan evidence is not available on appeal. 
Chuck's appeal fails hecause it relies on unavailable evidence. Under Utah law, 
evidence that is not considered by the district court cannot be considered on appeal. 152 
In this case, Chuck's appeal relies wholly on the Quinlan evidence. His entire brief 
presupposes that the Quinlan evidence was admitted below and that the Quinlan evidence 
is available on appeal. Indeed, without the Quinlan evidence, Chuck's arguments make 
no sense: He cannot claim that only Quinlan has standing, that Quinlan settled the FSBO 
commission claim, and so on if the available evidence does not even mention Quinlan. 
And the available evidence does not mention Quinlan. As far as this appeal is concerned, 
Dale Quinlan does not exist. Evidence regarding Quinlan was not even offered below 
until Chuck and others tried-at least six times-to admit the Quinlan evidence, 
beginning a year after trial. 153 The district court refused to consider it-every time. 
Because the district court never considered the Quinlan evidence, Chuck cannot 
152 Pilcher v. Dep 't of Soc. Servs., 663 P .2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983) ("Matters not admitted 
in evidence before the trier of fact will not be considered here.") ( citing Corbet v. Corbet, 
472 P.2d 430,433 (1970) ("On Appeal to this court we review the judgments and orders 
appealed from on the basis of the record upon which the trial court acted, and do not 
fermit the supplementing of our record with matters not before the trial court.")). 
53 See pp. 7-20, supra. 
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turn to that e·vidence on appeal. Without this foundational evidence, Chuck's appeal 
collapses. Each and every argument depends on the unavailable Quinlan evidence and 
therefore Chuck's appeal fizzles from the start. 
B. Chuck did not preserve his arguments for appeal. 
Chuck's arguments on appeal look nothing like his arguments in the lower court. 
Arguments not raised in the lower court will not be considered for the first time on 
appeal.154 
In the lower court, Chuck argued for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), (5), and (6), using 
the same argument under each subsection: The Quinlan evidence shows that Quinlan 
owned the Remax Elite dba when the FSBO was signed. The FSBO names "Remax 
vj Elite" as the party entitled to a commission. As a result, Quinlan, not the Aspenwood 
Plaintiffs, was a party to the FSBO and is therefore entitled to the commission. 155 
~ That was it. 
On appeal, this argument has nearly disappeared-of the 3 6 pages in Chuck's 
brief, Chuck's discussion of 60(b )( 4 ), ( 5), and ( 6) fills 2 pages. 156 Chuck provided only a 
single paragraph per subsection. 
Instead of raising the argument he actually made in the lower court, Chuck now 
focuses on Rule 60(b )(3).157 Chuck devotes page after page to revealing what he now 
considers an elaborate scheme to prevent him from discovering the Quinlan evidence. He 
154 L.G. v. State, 2015 UT 41, ,I 9,353 P.3d 131 (internal quotations and citations 
~ omitted). 
155 See pp. 12-16, supra. 
156 Br. of Appellant, 34-36. 
157 Id., 26-34. 
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also provides new legal arguments citing previously unreferenced cases, statutes, and 
regulations regarding his diligence in discovering the Quinlan evidence, the legal effect 
of actions by DCCC, and due process concems. 158 These arguments were not provided to 
the district court and the district court had no opportunity to rule on them. Consequently, 
Chuck cannot raise them on appeal. 
II. Aspenwood has standing to maintain this action. 
A. Chuck's standing argument may prevail only if no evidence supports the 
Plaintiffs' claim to standing. 
The Utah Supreme Court declared in 2010 that challenges to standing must be 
evaluated using the standard for a dispositive motion at the relevant stage of litigation. 159 
At this stage of litigation (i.e., after a jury trial has been held, a verdict returned, and a 
final judgment entered), the appropriate dispositive motion is a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 160 Therefore Chuck's challenge to Aspenwood's standing 
must be evaluated under the standard for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 161 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted only if no 
substantial evidence supports the verdict and the losing party is entitled to judgment as a 
158 For example, material presented here but not in the lower court includes additional 
allegations of fraud (Br. of Appellant, 28-29); arguments, statutes, and administrative 
rules regarding adjudicative proceedings by UDCC (Br. of Appellant, 22-24); and case 
law regarding fraud through partial disclosure (Br. of Appellant, 30-31). 
159 Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14,, 15,228 P.3d 747. 
160 Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b); see also Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d 566, 568-69 (Utah 
1967). 
161 Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14,, 15. 
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matter of law. 162 All evidence and reasonable inferences that support the verdict must be 
accepted as true, while conflicting evidence must be disregarded. 163 
In addition, the evidence must be taken as it existed at the close of trial, 164 and 
appellate courts give deference to factual determinations that affect standing. 165 And, 
contrary to Chuck's assertion that Aspenwood has the burden to establish standing, 166 
once the judgment against Chuck was entered, the burden of demonstrating a lack of 
standing shifted to Chuck.167 
In this case, the standing argument fails because substantial evidence was 
introduced at trial showing that Aspenwood has standing. The witnesses Skip Wing and 
Tim Shea both testified that Skip was Remax Elite's principal broker, thus satisfying the 
~ requirement in Utah Code § 61-2f-305 that the principal broker bring the lawsuit. 168 And 
while no testimony was offered to show the registration required by § 42-2-6.6, this 
registration can be reasonably inferred from Skip's testimony that Aspenwood owned the 
Remax Elite dba and was operating as Remax Elite. 169 Chuck's own counsel referred to 
Aspenwood throughout trial as Remax Elite and stated that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's 
162 Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988); Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d at 
568-69. 
163 Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d at 568-69. 
vJ 164 Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61, ,r 7, 987 P.2d 22 ("[T]he evidence must be taken 
as it existed at the close of the trial .... ") (quoting Townsend v. United States Rubber 
Co., 392 P.2d 404 (N.M. 1964)). 
165 Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ,r 10, 154 P.3d 808 (internal citations omitted). 
166 Br. of Appellant, 27. 
vJ 167 Miles v. Miles, 2011 UT App 359, ,r 6, 269 P.3d 958 (internal citation omitted). 
168 R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 183: 12-15; 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2. 
169 R. at 8384, pp. 164:19-165:21. Pretrial evidence also showed that Aspenwood had 
properly registered the Remax Elite dba. R. at 2167-68 
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principal broker. 170 In contrast, no evidence was offered at trial to suggest that 
Aspenwood did not own or had not properly registered the Remax Elite dba. 
Indeed, Chuck did not even attempt at trial to offer evidence showing that Skip 
Wing was not Remax Elite's principal broker, that the Remax Elite dba was not properly 
registered, or that some other party was the true owner of the Remax Elite dba.171 
Nothing was preventing Chuck from introducing this evidence. Chuck simply abandoned 
his standing argument-voluntarily-once the current plaintiffs were added to the case. 
As a result, where all trial evidence supports the conclusion that Aspenwood has 
standing and no contrary evidence was offered, Chuck's standing argument fails. This is 
true despite Chuck's efforts to introduce "newly discovered" evidence nearly a year after 
trial. 
B. The district court deemed untimely and did not consider evidence on standing 
offered for the first time nearly a year after trial. 
Standing is a jurisdictional matter that can be raised at any time, including after 
trial or on appeal. 172 But evidence supporting a standing argument may be excluded as 
untimely .173 And evidence that the district court did not consider cannot be considered on 
170 E.g., R. at 8384, pp. 149: 24-150:5, 153:5-12, 172:5-7, 174:3-9, 178: 12-13; 8385, ~ 
pp. 64:16-19, 65:22-66:1; 8387, pp. 78:16-79:5, 82:12-18, 83:2-6, 91:22-92:4, 92:14-
16. 
171 Seep. 24, supra. 
172 Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App 122, if 2,253 P.3d 1120. 
173 See Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ,r,r 49-51, 232 P.3d 486 (explaining that district ~ 
courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, including evidence the court 
deems untimely) (internal citations omitted). 
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appeal. 174 In this case, Chuck's standing argument relies entirely on evidence that the 
district court deemed untimely and refused to consider. Thus, while standing is an 
argument that cannot be waived, Chuck in effect waived his Quinlan argument by failing 
to timely off er supporting evidence. 
The Dale Quinlan issue first surfaced nearly a year after trial, when Chuck began 
VJb attempting to introduce evidence related to Quinlan's purported ownership of the Remax 
Elite dba. This Dale Quinlan evidence purported to establish that Quinlan, not 
Aspenwood, was the true owner of the Remax Elite dba ( and therefore Quinlan, not 
Aspenwood, was somehow entitled to the FSBO commission). 
Chuck and Still Standing clearly realized that the Quinlan evidence was crucial to 
~ their standing argument-in total, Chuck, Still Standing, or both together submitted six 
post-trial motions asking the court to consider the Quinlan evidence. 175 
In each instance, the district court absolutely refused to consider the Quinlan 
evidence. In doing so, the court found several times that this evidence could have been 
discovered with due diligence-findings that Chuck has not appealed.176 
In the end, despite Chuck's tenacity, the court never considered any evidence that 
would contradict the facts established at trial: Skip Wing was Remax Elite's principal 
broker and was entitled to seek a commission. This is a fatal flaw in Chuck's argument. 
174 Pilcher v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 663 P.2d 450,453 (Utah 1983) ("Matters not admitted 
in evidence before the trier of fact will not be considered here.") ( citing Corbet v. Corbet, 
472 P.2d 430,433 (1970) ("On Appeal to this court we review the judgments and orders 
appealed from on the basis of the record upon which the trial court acted, and do not 
permit the supplementing of our record with matters not before the trial court.")). 
175 See pp. 7-20, supra. 
176 See pp. 7-11, supra. 
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The Quinlan evidence-which Chuck's standing argument relies upon entirely-may not 
be considered on appeal. Without any supporting evidence, Chuck's standing argument 
necessarily fails. 
C. With due diligence Chuck would have discovered the Quinlan evidence. 
As the trial court noted, it is "beyond belief' that Chuck could not have found the 
Quinlan evidence with due diligence. 177 While the Quinlan evidence has ballooned into 
all manner of purportedly important documents, one alleged fact lies at the argument's 
core: the Remax Elite dba was registered in Quinlan's name when Shea and Chuck 
signed the FSBO. Therefore, under Chuck's reasoning, Quinlan was "Remax Elite" when 
the FSBO was signed, the FSBO identifies Shea's employer as "Remax Elite," and as a 
result Quinlan was a party to the FSBO and the only party with standing to pursue a 
commission. This argument, which continued throughout all six Quinlan motions, relies 
on that one fact, a fact that Chuck could have discovered with due diligence. 
Chuck had ample opportunity to discover that the dba was registered in Quinlan's 
name-an opportunity that Aspenwood could not have obstructed, even if it wanted to. 
As Chuck mentions in his Opening Brief, the status of the Remax Elite dba "vexed the 
entire litigation."178 Indeed, Chuck began investigating the status of the Remax Elite 
dba-including its registration documents-as early as December, 2009. 179 
Chuck investigated the Remax Elite registration documents to support his 
argument that the plaintiff "Remax Elite" was violating the assumed-name statute. Chuck 
177 R. at 7013. Ex. A. 
178 Br. of Appellant, 9. 
179 See pp. 5-6, supra; R. at 1451. 
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asked the court several times to dismiss the case asserting that because the Remax Elite 
dba was not properly registered with the state "Remax Elite' was prohibited from 
maintaining a lawsuit. 
To support his claim that the Remax Elite dba was not properly registered, Chuck 
looked up the dba's registration documents on file with the Utah Department of 
Commerce. He offered several of these documents as exhibits to establish the dba's 
· registration status. It is beyond belief that during his review of the dba's registration 
documents, Chuck would not have come across the document showing registration in 
Quinlan's name. 
And if Chuck did not find that document, he should have. Where the status of the 
l.iP Remax Elite dba "vexed the entire litigation"18° Chuck should have-at the very 
minimum-taken a careful look at the dba's actual registration documents. This 
information was a matter of public record. Chuck did not need permission from 
Aspenwood, the discovery process, a court order, or any other assistance to obtain the 
information. 
In other words, the core fact underlying the Quinlan arguments was readily 
available to Chuck throughout the entire litigation. And even though the dba' s status was 
central to Chuck's pretrial arguments, Chuck either did not review the dba registration 
documents thoroughly or simply did not discern at the time the arguments he began 
raising a year after trial. 
To be sure, Chuck has elaborated on his Quinlan argument, beginning in his 
180 Br. of Appellant, 9. 
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second post-trial Quinlan motion. He argues not only that Quinlan owned the Remax 
Elite dba when the FSBO was signed, but that Quinlan never transferred his interest in 
that dba to Aspenwood. According to Chuck, this means that Aspenwood is in violation 
of the assumed-name statute and that this violation cannot be cured. 
But this and all other derivative Quinlan arguments necessarily stem from the 
purportedly critical fact that Quinlan originally registered the dba in his name. This 
information has always been publicly available. If Chuck missed it, despite years of 
litigation dedicated to resolving the status of the Remax Elite dba, he cannot complain 
now. 
D. Aspenwood's post-trial evidence directly refuted the Dale Quinlan evidence and 
corresponding claims. 
Even if this Court considers evidence that the district court rejected, that evidence 
does not demonstrate a lack of standing. At this point in the litigation, evidence 
supporting Aspenwood's standing must be accepted as true Chuck's while conflicting 
evidence must be disregarded. 181 But Chuck's brief fails to marshal evidence that was 
offered to contradict Chuck's Quinlan claims. This evidence, like Chuck's evidence, was 
not considered below and should not be considered here. But if this Court considers the 
Quinlan evidence, it must also weigh evidence refuting the Quinlan claim. 182 
Once that refuting evidence is considered, the Quinlan arguments fall flat. In short, 
Dale Quinlan had nothing to do with this case. 183 It was Aspenwood LLC that purchased 
181 Koer v. Mayfair Mlcts., 431 P.2d 566, 568-69 (Utah 1967). 
182 See id. 
183 See pp. 20-23, supra. 
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the right to use the Remax Elite name from Remax International. Aspenwood LLC 
assigned Quinlan, as Aspenwood LLC' s agent, to register the Remax Elite dba. Quinlan 
registered the dba in his own name by mistake. 
Remax International discovered this mistake when Aspenwood attempted to 
secure a second Remax franchise. When Remax International discovered the 
unacceptable registration, it required that the registration be corrected before it would 
license another Remax name to Aspenwood. As a result, Aspenwood assigned Quinlan, 
at this point Aspenwood's corporate secretary, to correct the registration. Quinlan did so. 
This is confirmed by DCCC documents showing that both Aspenwood Real Estate and 
Elite Legacy Corporation owned the Remax Elite dba. 
In addition, Quinlan has never asserted that he was the principal broker associated 
with the failed transaction. Nor could he, having lost his principal broker's license seven 
months earlier. The principal broker actually associated with the FSBO was Skip Wing, 
which was established by unopposed trial testimony. 184 
To summarize, even if the Quinlan evidence is considered, the remaining evidence 
establishes that Quinlan had no involvement with the FSBO, that Quinlan could not have 
been the principal broker associated with the FSBO, and that Quinlan never had a right to 
the Remax Elite dba. Therefore Chuck's standing argument fails. 
E. Even if the untimely evidence is considered, Chuck's arguments fail as a matter 
of law. 
In a derivative Quinlan argument, Chuck asserts that the assumed-name statute 
184 S ee p. 24, supra. 
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prevents Aspenwood from maintaining this lawsuit. According to Chuck, the Remax 
Elite dba either has expired or belongs to Still Standing. 185 Even if Chuck has not waived 
this argument and some evidence exists that Quinlan owned the dba, that Aspenwood did 
not properly register the dba, or that Still Standing now owns the dba, Chuck's argument 
still fails, for four reasons: 
1. Aspenwood has statutory standing to pursue the commission claim. 
2. The assumed-name statute does not bar Aspenwood from maintaining this 
action. 
3. Any failure to properly register the dba can still be cured. 
4. Public policy does not allow cases to be dismissed based on evidence 
offered nearly a year after trial. 
1. Aspenwood has statutory standing to pursue the commission claim. 
Even if Quinlan owned or if Still Standing currently owns the Remax Elite dba, 
Aspenwood still has standing to pursue the commission under the principal-broker 
statute. Under that statute, when a real estate agent earns a commission, the agent cannot 
pursue the commission on its own-only the agent's principal broker may pursue the 
commission: "Any action for the recovery of a fee, commission or other compensation 
may only be instituted and brought by the principal broker with whom the sales agent or 
associate broker is affiliated."186 
The real estate agent in this case was Tim Shea. Thus, under the principal-broker 
statute only "the principal broker with whom [Tim Shea] is affiliated" could institute an 
185 Br. of Appellant, pp. 25-26. 
186 Utah Code Ann. § 6 l-2f-409(2)(b) (2015) ( emphasis added). 
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action to recover the commission. 
In this case, the principal broker affiliated with Shea was Skip Wing. 187 Skip's 
status as Shea's principal broker was established early on in this case, mostly as a result 
of Chuck's efforts to have the case dismissed. Chuck tenaciously maintained that only 
Skip Wing could maintain this lawsuit because Skip was Shea's principal broker. Chuck 
even went so far as to assert as undisputed fact in a summary judgment motion that Skip 
was Shea'-s }. incipal broker. This undisputed fact was confirmed at trial by testin:ony 
from both Skip and Shea that Skip was Shea's principal broker. Chuck's own counsel 
repeatedly referred to Skip at trial as the principal broker. 
Shea's principal broker certainly wasn't Quinlan. Quinlan lost his principal broker 
vJ license in July, 2005-seven months before Shea signed the FSBO. 188 Quinlan continued 
to work for Aspenwood, but only as a ground-level real estate agent, just like Shea. This 
fact alori•e eliminates Quinlan as the principal broker affiliated with Shea. And if Quinlan 
was not the principal broker "with whom [Tim Shea] is affiliated," Quinlan has no 
standing to pursue Shea's commission. 189 
In addition, Quinlan's purported ownership of the Remax Elite dba does not, as 
Chuck asserts, somehow automatically make Quinlan the only possible principal broker 
associated with the transaction or the "true FSBO contracting party." According to 
Chuck, because Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba and because the FSBO listed 
"Remax Elite" as a contracting party, the FSBO was actually a contract between Chuck 
187 S ee p. 24, supra. 
188 Seep. 21, supra. 
189 Utah Code Ann.§ 61-2-18 (now§ 61-2f-409(2)(b)). 
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and Quinlan. 190 This assertion relies on an inaccurate legal assumptio~, i.e., that naming a 
person in a contract automatically makes that person a party to the contract. 191 
In other words, even if "Remax Elite" means Quinlan, Quinlan does not 
automatically become a party to the FSBO simply because the FSBO mentions "Remax 
Elite." No evidence in this case-including Quinlan's own affidavit-suggests that 
Quinlan was even aware of the deal or that Shea was acting on Quinlan's behalf. Instead, 
it is undisputed that Shea worked for Aspen wood and that Skip Wing was Shea's 
principal broker. If Shea improperly identified Aspenwood as "Remax Elite" in the 
FSBO, that does not mean that Shea was ineffectually attempting to bind Quinlan to a 
contract Quinlan didn't even know existed. Instead, it would mean only that all parties 
executing the transaction did so under the mistake of fact that "Remax Elite" meant 
Aspenwood.192 
If Chuck had raised this argument timely, the jury could have-and surely would 
have based on the undisputed facts-reformed the transaction documents to say 
"Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation" rather than "Remax Elite." 
In short, whether the dba registration was in Quinlan's name or not is irrelevant. 
Shea earned the commission, and Aspenwood was Shea's principal broker. Under the 
principal-broker statute, Aspenwood has standing to pursue the commission. 
190 Br. of Appellant, 16. 
191 E.g., Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, ,r 27, 989 P.2d 1077 stating 
that an agreement is _not binding on a party without that party's acceptance. 
192 E.g., England v. Harbach, 944 P .2d 340, 343 (Utah 1997) stating that contractual 
provisions may be reformed upon mutual mistake of contracting parties. 
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2. The assumed-name statute does not prevent Aspenwood from maintaining 
this lawsuit. 
The assumed-name statute requires a party conducting business under an assumed 
name to properly register that name before the party may maintain judicial 
proceedings. 193 This statute does not apply to Aspenwood because Aspenwood is not 
conducting business under an assumed name. 
Clearly Aspenwood conducted business in the past under the assumed name 
Remax Elite. This was established by testimony at trial. But the Aspenwood plaintiffs no 
longer conduct any business at all: Skip Wing is retired and Aspenwood and Elite Legacy 
ceased operating years ago. 194 Where the assumed-name statute applies only to parties 
actively conducting business, and where the Aspenwood plaintiffs no longer conduct 
business, the assumed-name statute does not apply to the Aspenwood plaintiffs. 
More importantly, the pretrial and trial evidence supports the conclusion that 
VP Aspenwood properly maintained its dba during all times that Aspenwood was conducting 
business under the name Remax Elite. 195 This includes proper registration at the time this 
lawsuit was initiated. 196 But once Aspenwood ceased conducting business as Remax 
Elite, the assumed-name statute no longer required Aspenwood to properly register the 
Remax Elite dba. 
This analysis comports with the assumed-name statute's purpose: to notify the 
193 Utah Code Ann.§ 42-2-10 (2015). 
194 R. at 1092; 1483-85; 2153; 8384, p. 164:13-18. 
195 R. at 2167-68; 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 164:19-165:21, 183: 12-15; 8385, pp. 87:15-
88:2. 
196 See R. at 2167-68. 
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public who owns the business and protect those who transact business with the 
underlying owner. 197 The Remax Elite dba was properly registered during all times that 
Aspenwood was conducting business, and therefore all parties conducting business with 
Aspenwood-including Chuck-had notice concerning the use of the assumed name. 
Once Aspenwood shut down, there was no longer a need to protect persons transacting 
business with Aspen wood ( since no business was being transacted at all), and thus no 
longer a need to register the Remax Elite dba. 
Chuck might counter this argument by suggesting that Aspenwood continues to 
conduct business as Remax Elite because Aspenwood is still involved in this litigation. 
Indeed, the term "dba Remax Elite" does follow each plaintiffs name in the captions of 
Aspenwood's pleadings. 198 But this defect-if it is a defect-can be cured through a 
simple instruction to the district court to remove "dba Remax Elite" from the captions. 199 
This simple remedy would clarify that the Aspenwood plaintiffs are not conducting 
business under an assumed name and are not maintaining this lawsuit under an assumed 
name. 
In Graham v. Davis County,200 an unincorporated environmental watch-dog 
committee sued a government agency over alleged ORAMA violations.201 The complaint 
was filed in the committee's name, but the committee later amended the complaint to 
197 Putnam v. Indus!. Comm'n, 14 P.2d 973 (Utah 1932). 
198 Graham v. Davis County Solid Wast Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist., 
1999 UT App 136, 979 P.2d 363. 
199 1999 UT App 136, 979 P.2d 363. 
200 Id, iJiJ 1--4, 8. 
201 Id., ,I 8_ 
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make Mr. Graham, a committee member, the plaintiff.202 The agency argued that the 
committee's original complaint was void because the committee had not complied with 
the assumed-name statute. 203 
The Utah Court of Appeals acknowledged that the original complaint was 
defective because the unregistered committee violated the assumed-name statute. 204 But 
the Court held that the amendment allowing Graham to replace the committee as plaintiff 
cured the violation. 205 As a result, the Court rejected the agency's jurisdictional argument·. 
based on the assumed-name statute.206 
Like the amendment in Graham, an amendment to the Complaint in this case 
would cure any violation of the assumed-name statute. As a matter of law, the 
vJ Aspenwood Plaintiffs cannot violate the assumed-name statute if they are not conducting 
business under the assumed name "Remax Elite" and are not maintaining this lawsuit 
under that name. 207 This is true even if Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba and sold it to 
Still Standing. 
Moreover, the statute requires only that "the provisions of [the assumed-name] 
chapter are complied with" before a party may maintain a lawsuit.208 If the Quinlan 
evidence is considered on appeal and accepted as true, that evidence would establish that 
the provisions of the chapter have been complied with (i.e., the Remax Elite dba is 
202 Id., 14_ 
203 Id., 1 B. 
204 Id. , 11 13-15. 
2osld.,~l 6. 
206 Id. 
207 Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10 (2015). 
20s Id. 
41 
registered and active). And if the provisions of the assumed-name chapter are complied 
with, the statute is satisfied and allows Aspenwood to maintain its case. 
3. Any failure to comply with the assumed-name statute may be cured. 
Even if this Court considers the untimely Quinlan evidence and determines that 
Still Standing owns the Remax Elite dba, Aspenwood can still cure this defect by 
recovering and properly registering the Remax Elite dba. The recovery process would 
require time and possibly anoth~r round of litigation (the last thing this favJsuit needs). 
But Still Standing's claim to the Remax Elite dba would not withstand judicial scrutiny, 
for two reasons: 1) Still Standing's registration of Remax Elite violates the assumed-
name statute; and 2) even if Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba, Quinlan had no right to 
transfer it to Still Standing. 
The Utah Code does not allow Still Standing to register the Remax Elite dba if the 
dba is misleading regarding Still Standing's business purpose.209 And the name Remax 
Elite applied to Still Standing is certainly misleading. The name "Remax Elite" implies 
that the underlying entity is a real estate brokerage and a Remax International franchisee. 
Still Standing is obviously not a real estate brokerage and no evidence exists to show that 
Still Standing is a Remax International franchisee. As a result, Still Standing's use of the 
Remax Elite dba is misleading and§ 42-2-6.6(1)(a) prevents Still Standing from 
maintaining that dba. 
In addition, Dale Quinlan had no right to assign the Remax Elite dba to Still 
209 See Utah Code Ann.§ 42-2-6.6(1)(a) (2015). 
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Standing. 210 Aspenwood negotiated with and purchased the right to use the Remax Elite 
name from Remax International. All rights associated with the Remax Elite name 
belonged to Aspenwood. Indeed, when Remax International discovered that Quinlan was 
mistakenly listed as the owner of the Remax Elite name, it immediately required that 
Aspenwood correct this mistake. 
In short, Still Standing claims that it owns the Remax Elite dba, but that claim has 
never been tested. If Aspeff-.vood is forced to use the judicial system to reclaim and re-
register the Remax Elite dba, it can and will do so. Thus, even if the assumed-name 
statute currently prevents Aspenwood from maintaining this lawsuit, Aspenwood can 
cure this defect, making Chuck's argument moot. 
4. Public policy does not allow final judgments to be reversed based on 
untimely evidence. 
As a public policy matter, Chuck's standing argument should not be considered. 
~ Dismissing a case based on evidence that was readily available but not offered until 
nearly a year after trial sets horrible precedent. Such precedent would disregard the 
fundamental protections afforded by the judicial process, including the opportunity to 
request documents from opposing parties and to depose adverse witnesses. 
Here, Aspenwood has not had these vital protections: Aspenwood had no 
opportunity to cross-examine Dale Quinlan, to depose him, to compel his appearance as a 
witness, or to subpoena documents from him or from the State of Utah that might 
undermine Chuck's new evidence. Quinlan has never appeared in any proceeding in this 
210 See pp. 20-23, supra. 
43 
case, before, during, or after trial. Aspen wood's lack of opportunity to contest the 
Quinlan evidence is prejudicial because the Quinlan evidence leaves critical questions 
unanswered: 
• Does UDCC have authority to unilaterally reassign ownership of a dba? 
No rules or regulations were ever cited to the district court suggesting that 
the Department of Corporations has this authority. 
• Who requested the reassignment? 
... ~ What was the basis for the decision to reassign? 
• Did UDCC give notice to potentially affected parties? 
• Did affected parties, including Aspenwood, have an opportunity to be 
heard? 
• Who made the final decision to reassign the dba, and was that person a 
fair, neutral decision maker? 
The Quinlan evidence does not answer these questions. As a result, dismissing this case 
relying upon the incomplete Quinlan evidence amounts to a violation of Aspenwood' s 
due process rights. 
In addition, allowing untimely evidence concerning standing renders "final 
judgments" forever unstable. If litigants can dismiss already-decided cases based on 
newly discovered standing evidence, virtually every case ever decided remains up in the 
air. Surely the judicial system does not allow such a result. Litigation must end sometime, 
and final judgments should be just that-final.211 
211 See Kelley v. Kelley, 2010 UT App 236, 160, 9 P.3d 171 (emphasizing public interest 
in putting an end to litigation and preserving final judgments). 
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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 60(b) motion. 
A district court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion 
and is "rarely vulnerable to attack.'~212 District courts receive broad discretion because 
~ 60(b) rulings "are equitable in nature, saturated with facts, and call upon judges to apply 
fundamental principles of fairness that do not easily lend themselves to appellate 
review. "213 
This admonition applies-here~ the district court observed over eight years of 
litigation, including Chuck's beyond-relentless litigation strategy, Chuck's opportunity to 
discover the Quinlan evidence, Chuck's tendency to submit what the district court called 
"cumulative and unnecessary motions,"214 and Chuck's allegations of fraud. Counsel 
v;; cannot hope to even remotely re-create that experience. A case this convoluted does not 
lend itse~f to appellate review, justifying the broad discretion afforded to the district 
court. 
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion under 60(b)(3). 
Chuck did not preserve this argument for appeal. While Chuck's Rule 60 motion 
\ii listed fraud under 60(b)(3) as a ground for relief, Chuck's supporting memorandum and 
oral argument did not provide any argument, analysis, or citation to authority asserting 
that relief from judgment was appropriate under Rule 60(b )(3 ).215 Instead, Chuck asserted 
fraud as justification for the timeliness of the motion only. Because Chuck did not request 
~ 212 Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, il 7, 104 P.3d 1198 (internal citations omitted). 
213 Id. 
214 R. at 7012. 
215 See pp. 12-13, supra. 
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-~ 
relief under 60(b)(3), both the district court's oral ruling and written order did not address 
it. As a result, Chuck has not preserved for appeal the argument that he is entitled to relief 
from judgment under Rule 60(b)(3).216 
Even if he had raised the argument, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
under 60(b)(3) because no fraud occurred in connection with Dale Quinlan. As explained 
in Section II, Part D, Quinlan had nothing to do with this case.217 Once all the evidence 
regarding Quinlan is considered, it becomes apparent that Quinlan registered the dba ,in 
his name by mistake and that Aspenwood owned the right to the dba through a franchise 
agreement with Remax International. 
In other words, Chuck's suggestion that Aspenwood somehow deceived him 
regarding Quinlan's involvement is inaccurate: Quinlan had no association with the 
FSBO, was not the principal broker associated with the FSBO, had no right to the Remax 
Elite dba, and did not own an interest in or even work for Remax Elite at the time 
depositions and discovery were conducted. Indeed, the trial court expressly ruled that 
even if the Quinlan evidence was considered, at best this would mean that Quinlan held 
the dba for Aspen wood's benefit. 21o 
In addition, as described in Section II, Part C, it is beyond belief that Chuck could 
not have discovered the Quinlan evidence had he exercised due diligence during the years 
that the litigation focused on the status of the Remax Elite dba. 
216 L.G. v. State, 2015 UT 41,, 9,353 P.3d 131 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
217 See pp. 20-23, supra. 
218 R. at 8241-42. Ex. C. 
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The district court observed all of this and rejected Chuck's allegations of fraud-
six times. Where the district court is best positioned to evaluate such fact-sensitive 
matters, this Court should defer to the district court's judgment. 
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion under 60(h)(4) or 60(b)(5). 
Chuck's arguments under Rule 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(5) arguments merely continue 
his Quinlan-based standing argument and therefore fail for the same reason: No evidence 
regarding Quinlan was admitted by the court and all properly admitted evidence 
suggested that Aspenwood owned the commission claim and had standing to pursue that 
claim. Moreover, Chuck has not asserted that the district court erred in excluding the 
Quinlan evidence or committed clear error in finding that Chuck could have discovered 
~ the evidence with due diligence. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Chuck's Quinlan arguments where no Quinlan evidence was 
considered. 
Further, even if this Court considers the Quinlan evidence, the district court still 
did not abuse its discretion under 60(b )( 4) or 60(b )( 5), for three reasons: Aspen wood is 
~ the proper party to bring the claim under the principal-broker statute and any ownership 
Quinlan had in the Remax Elite dba was for Aspenwood's benefit. 
First, as explained in Section II, Part E( 1 ), under the Utah principal-broker statute, 
only the principal broker "with whom the sales agent or associate broker is affiliated" 
may sue to recover a commission. 219 It is undisputed that the sales agent's principal 
broker was Aspenwood. No evidence-including the Quinlan evidence-suggests that 
219 Utah Code Ann. § 61-2f-409(2)(b) (2015). 
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Quinlan was the principal broker associated with Shea when the FSBO was signed. 
Indeed, such a suggestion would be impossible-Quinlan relinquished his principal 
broker status seven months before Shea signed the FSBO. 
Second, even if Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba, he did so only as an agent for 
Aspenwood and for Aspenwood's benefit.220 As the district court pointed out, after a final 
judgment, all facts must be construed in favor ofthatjudgment.221 Indeed, the court ruled 
that the Quinlan could. be construed in a way supporting the judgment: Quinlan registered . 
and held the Remax Elite dba in his role as an agent of the company Aspenwood Real 
Estate and for Aspenwood's benefit.222 Where even the Quinlan evidence can be viewed 
in a light that supports the final judgment, that evidence does not establish that relief was 
appropriate under 60(b)(4) or 60(b)(5) and the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion under those subsections. 
Third, as explained in Section II, Part E( 1 ), the Quinlan evidence-at best-
establishes only that the FSBO parties signed it under the mistake of fact that "Remax 
Elite" meant Shea's employer, Aspenwood.223 
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion under 60(b)(6). 
In the lower court, Chuck made three arguments under Rule 60(b )( 6): First, Chuck 
should be allowed to "supplement earlier motions with testimony from Dale Quinlan to 
explain why the Seller's side was damaged by the conduct of an incompetent agent and 
220 See pp. 11-12, supra. 
221 R. at 8238-39 (Ex. C); 8264; see also Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d 566, 568-69 
(Utah 1967). 
222 See pp. 11-12, supra. 
223 0 Seep. 1 , supra. 
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broker."224 Second, Chuck argued that the judgment should be dismissed based on 
Quinlan's failure to mediate.225 Finally, Chuck argued that earlier rulings regarding 
mediation and an assignment agreement should be corrected in light of the Quinlan 
evidence. 226 
The argument on appeal abandons these three arguments. Instead, Chuck now 
combines arguments he makes in other places: Aspenwood violated the principal-broker 
statute, Aspenwood violated the assumed-name statute, and Aspenwood concealed 
Quinlan during discovery.227 Chuck asserts that these considerations together justify relief 
under 60(b )( 6). 
But because Chuck did not present this argument in connection with 60(b)(6) 
vJ) below, he cannot do so here.228 Further, Chuck raises these arguments elsewhere in his 
appeal and they should be considered on their merits there. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Aspenwood was awarded its attorney fees against Chuck in the lower court. If 
Aspen wood prevails on appeal, it is entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal. 229 
224 R. at 7318. 
225 R. at 7319. 
226 Id. 
~ 227 Br. of Appellant, 35-36. 
228 L.G. v. State, 2015 UT 41, ,r 9,353 P.3d 131 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
229 Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 2014 UT 14, ,r 61,326 P.3d 656. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court saw the Quinlan issue for what it was: an unpersuasive, untimely 
attempt to introduce evidence that Chuck could have discovered years earlier. Where 
Rule 60 motions are generally "saturated with facts, and call upon judges to apply 
fundamental principles of fairness that do not easily lend themselves to appellate 
review"230 this Court should defer to the district court's observation that it is "beyond 
belief' that Chuck could not have discovered the Quinlan evidence with due diligence. 
For this reason, and because even with consideration of the Quinlan evidence the 
trial court did not abuse its broad discretion, Aspenwood respectfully requests that the 
district court be affirmed. 
DATED and SIGNED this 16th day of October, 2015. 
Attorneys for Aspenwood 
230 Miles v. Miles, 2011 UT App 359, ~ 6, 269 P.3d 958 (internal citations omitted). 
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EXHIBIT A 
Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Chuck's Motion to Dismiss 
(first ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence) 
RULING & ORDER ON MOTIONS TO CLARIFY AND SCHV ANEVBLDr-S MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMMISSION CLAIMS BASED ON LACK OF STANDING AND JURISDICTION 
Case No. 060906802 
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Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Clarify 
On June 25, 2013, Still Standing Stables ("SSS")filed its Motion to Clarify Rulings and 
Identify Real Parties, and on June 28, 2013, Schvaneveldt filed yet another motion to dismiss for 
lack of standing and jurisdiction. As both motions were prepared by attorney Robert Fuller and 
contain similar arguments, the court will address them both here. 
At the outset, the court expresses its dismay that Schvaneveldt and SSS continue to raise 
issues concerning standing after this case has already been through a jury trial and attorney fees 
have been awarded. Standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any point during 
litigation. Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App. 122, 1 2. This court, however, loses jurisdiction once 
a final judgment is entered. This court entered a judgment of $212,806.70 against Schvanveldt 
on January 2, 2013. This case is over. A jury heard the issues, and the court awarded attorney 
fees to the prevailing parties. Issues regarding standing should have been raised years ago. 
The Court acknowledges that Defendants, current motions regarding standing are 
partially prompted by Plaintiffs, unmeritorious argwnent that Mr. Wing is not a party subject to 
liability for the award of attorney fees, but a simple memorandum in opposition to Mr. Wing's 
Motion to Clarify should have sufficed. This is precisely the type of cumulative and unnessary 
motion that justified the significant attorney fees awarded in this case, and caused this case to 
languish on the court's docket for years. 
Despite the court's hesitancy to even address Defendants' standing arguments, the court, 
out of an abundance of caution, will briefly address each of Defendants' arguments. 
First, on the basis of"reccnt discoveries regarding the true ownership of Remax Elite" 
Schvaneveldt argues that none of the plaintiffs were parties to the FSBO or Real Estate Purchase 
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Contract (''REPC,,), but rather that the dba "ReMax Elite" was registered to Dale Quinlan 
("Quinlan'') at the time the FSBO and REPC were signed, and that Quinlan never transferred the 
rights under the agreement to any of the plaintiffs. Raising this question of fact concerning the 
standing of the plaintiffs at this late date is unwarranted. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), 
governing motions for relief from judgment, is instructive here. It states that relief from 
judgment based on new evidence is only pennissible if (1) the motion is filed within three 
months after the judgment, and (2) due diligence could not have discovered the new evidence in 
time for a new trial under Rule 59(b). Judgment against Schvanveldt was entered in January 
2013. Further, that judgment was entered based on ajury verdict entered in August 2012. Until 
this time, all of the parties had agreed that Mr. Wing was the principal broker of ReMax Elite, 
the contracting party. In fact, Defendants abandoned their previous arguments regarding 
standing once Mr. Wing was added as a plaintiff. Raising new factual issues nearly a year after a 
jury trial and six months after entry of judgment will not be pennitted. Even if this motion were 
timely, Schvaneveldt bas provided no explanation for why this new evidence could not have 
been discovered in time for a rule 59(b) motion. This case was filed in 2006, and the issues 
regarding the commission were first raised in 2008. It is beyond belief that Schvaneveldt could 
not have discovered this evidence with due diligence. 
Even if the court were inclined to consider Schvanveldt' s new factual assertions, 
Schvanveldt's evidence attached to his Motion to Dismiss does not contradict the preswnption 
that has always been present in this case, i.e., that Mr. Wing was the principal broker associated 
with the FSBO. Schvaneveldt's evidence only shows that the dba Remax Elite was transferred to 
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Skip Wing a short time after the FSBO and REPC were consummated. It does not show that 
Quinlan did not assign the claims at some other time. 
Schvaneveldt's tries to establish that Quinlan did not transfer his claims to Mr. Wing by 
submitting his July 8, 2013 "Supplemental Authority and Exhibits in Support of: Motion to 
Dismiss Commission Claims Based on Lack of Standing and Jurisdiction" containing an 
affidavit of Dale Quinlan. Dale Quinlan states, "I do not believe nor do I have any recollection 
of ever assigning any commission agreement or contract rights between myself, doing business 
wider the assumed name REMA ELITE, and the Seller, specified above, to any other individual 
nor entity." Based on this statement, and his own observations of the signatures, Scbvaneveldt 
argues that a transfer never occurred and the letters of transfer "appear to be phoney docwnents 
filed with the State of Utah Division of Corporations with fraudulent intent." 
Even if Rule 60(b) did not bar consideration of Quinlan's affidavit, which it does, the 
court never granted leave for Schvaneveldt to file "Supplemental Authority and Exhibits" and 
will not consider it, U.R.C.P. 7(c)(l) ("No other memoranda will be considered without leave of 
court"), except to note that allegations of forgery and fraud are affinnative defenses which must 
be raised in Defendants' Answer. U.R.C.P. 8. Although Defendants' Answer raised issues of 
forgery and fraud with respect to the FSBO and REPC, Defendants never raised any such issues 
pertaining to any Letter of Transfer; accordingly, such arguments are waived. 
Second, SSS argues that because Mr. Wing argues in his Motion to Clarify that he was 
not a party to the FSBO, Mr. Wing lacked standing to sue for the commission. Having rejected 
Mr. Wing's arguments, however, this issue is moot. The facts and proceduraJ posture of this 
case are clear. Mr. Wing1 as part of the collective "ReMax," sued the defendants for the 
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commission based on the FSBO, and Mr. Wing is the principal agent ofReMax, that was named 
as a party to the FSBO. Accordingly, Mr. Wing has standing to assert the commission claim. 
Defendants nearly admitted as much by abandoning their standing arguments once Mr. Wing 
was added as a plaintiff. 
Third, SSS argues that Elite Legacy Corporation does not have standing to sue because it 
was not a party to the FSBO and did not exist when the FSBO and REPC were signed. Elite 
Legacy Corporation and Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation are separate corporate entities that 
owned the dba ReMax Elite at different times. Both corporations have been plaintiffs in this 
action ever since the Third Amended Complaint was filed, and both entities were fanned by the 
same principal agent, Mr. Wing. The court sees no value in drawing a distinction between them 
at this time, when both entities are ultimately controlled by Mr. Wing, who is jointly liable. 
Fourth, SSS argues that Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation does not have standing to 
sue because it assigned its commission cause of action to Tim Shea. Although "ReMax', 
executed an Assignment containing language purporting to transfer "any and all claims, 
demands, and causes of action of any kind whatsoever which ReMax has or may have against 
Still Standing Stables, LLC," to Tim Shea, it is clear that the parties intended for ReMax to retain 
the right 10 pursue the commission claim. Specifically, the Assignment states, ''Tim's lawyer 
may represent Tim's interests and act as co-counsel for ReMax in pursuing ReMax's offensive 
claim .... " ( emphasis added). Further, the Assignment contemplates that Tim Shea did not have 
the right to bring the commission cause of action, stating " ... the parties agree that it will be best 
if Tim prosecutes, collects, settles, compromises, and grants releases in ReMax's name .... " 
Accordingly, the court interprets the Assignment as giving Tim Shea the right to collect the 
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benefits of the commission claim, minus the first $10,000, and the right to direct the prosecution 
of the claim, but ReMax retained the right to stand as the formal party asserting the cause of 
action. This interpretation is strengthened by the timing of the Assignment, September 2008, the 
same month that this court granted ReMax and Sheats first motion to amend but clarified that 
only the principal broker could assert the commission claim. Ruling Granting Motion for Leave 
to Amend, (September 2, 2008). 
Lastly, Defendants insist that Aspenwood and Elite Legacy do not have standing because 
they are defunct corporations, and are not "principal brokers. n This is an exact replica of 
standing arguments asserted years ago, which Defendants abandoned because Mr. Wing was 
added as a plaintiff. Defendants were wise to abandon this argwnent after Mr. Wing was added 
as a party, and they should not have resurrected it here. Because Mr. Wing is the principal of 
both corporations, and a party to this action, drawing a distinction between them is meaningless. 
The parties' requests for a hearing on these matters are denied; oral argument will not 
assist the court in deciding the issues herein addressed. 
Order & Judgment 
Accordingly, Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt's Motion to Dismiss Commission Claims 
Based on Lack of Standing and Jurisdiction is denied. To the extent that Defendant Still 
Standing Stable's Motion to Clarify seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs, commission claim, it is denied. 
ro the extent that the parties' seek clarification regarding who is a judgment creditor and who is 




Ruling and Order on Motion to Dismiss based on Settlement Agreement 
(second ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence) 
AUG 1 3 20U SECOND ISTRICT C URT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HILARY "SKIP WING, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STILL STANDING STABLE, L.C., et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING & ORDER ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS ALL REMAX ELITE 
COUNTERCLAIMS BASED ON 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Case No. 060906802 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
This matter is before the court on Defendants Still Standing Stable, L.C., and Chuck 
Schvaneveldt's Motion to Dismiss All Remmc Elite Counterclaims Based on Settlement 
Agreement. Pursuant to the following, Defendants' Motion is denied. 
Defendants' motion is based entirely on its new theory, based on new evidence, that a 
third party, Dale Quinlan, is the true owner of Plaintiffs' claim, and that Defendants have settled 
the matter with Quinlan. 
As discussed in this court>s July 22, 2013 Ruling and Order on Motions to Clarify and 
Schvaneveldt' s Motion to Dismiss Commission Claims Based on Lack of Standing and 
Jurisdiction, this court cannot consider new evidence from Defendants after a final judgment 
wtless, pursuant to rule 60(b ), the motion is filed within three months after the judgment and due 
diligence could not have discovered the new evidence in time for a new trial under Rule 59(b). 
Here, judgment against Schvanveldt was entered in January 2013 and all of the claims against 
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Still Standing Stables have long been dismissed. Further, the January judgment was entered 
based on a jury verdict entered in August 2012. Accordingly, this motion is untimely. 
Even if Defendants' motion was timely, Schvaneveldt has not provided any explanation 
for why this new evidence could not have been discovered in time for a Rule 59(b) motion. 
Another fatal flaw to consideration of this new evidence. 
Lastly, even if this motion were not time barred and Defendants did have some 
reasonable excuse why they could not discover this new evidence earlier, settling a claim that 
could be raised by a third party does not per se indicate that the plaintiffs in this case did not 
have standing to assert their claims. At best the new evidence would raise a material question of 
fact concerning proper ownership of the commission claim 
The court does not believe that oral argument on this matter will contribute anything to 
its understanding of the issues or the law. Accordingly, Defendants' request for a hearing is 
denied. 
ORDER 
Pursuant to the foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss All ReMax Elite 
Counterclaims Based on Settlement Agreement is denied. No further order pursuant to rule 7(f) 
is required. The court is satisfied that this case is closed. 
DATED this ~day of~ 2013 
RULING & ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS ALL REMAX ELITE COUNTERCLAIMS BASED ON 
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Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion 
(third ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence) 
This case was tried with a jury, and so the alternative under Rule 
59(a)( 4) that the Court is permitted to consider newly discovered evidence, 
provides that the party bringing the motion can only produce evidence that 
he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
That is an issue which has been previously addressed, and this Court's 
ruling is not going to depart from the prior rulings .. 
And that is, that the information specifically the documentation from 
the Department of Corporations, and the information contained in that 
documentation, also challenges with respect to the validity or invalidity of 
signatures, and whether or not they're forged or have been cut and pasted, 
all of those kinds of things were information that could, by reasonable 
diligence, have been discovered and determined well before a trial was 
conducted in this case. 
The record is abundantly clear that these are all public records. They 
have been available to all of the parties throughout these proceedings. 
There have been references to the dba registration during the trial. 
There is documentation in the record of the Department of Corporations 
showing registrations in the corporate names of Elite Legacy and Aspenwood 
Real Estate. Those are all part of the record in the public file, and they were 
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all available, as well as records including the signature of Dale Quinlan, 
which would put anyone on notice of his potential interest in those dbas. 
And the Court specifically rules that it is under Rule 59 that new 
evidence may be considered under appropriate circumstances. 
In this case, the Court's ruling is that the Rule 59 latitude for 
modification of findings and conclusions does not apply and is not available. 
And even if it were available, would not be justified based upon this 
evidence, which the Court rules is new evidence, which could reasonably 
have been known prior to the trial being conducted. 
With respect to Rule 52, which is the specific focus of the motion, and 
the motion which the Court has determined to be timely, the Court's ruling is 
that there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new evidence. 
The policy underlying Rule 52 is to make sure that the findings and 
conclusions that are entered in the record are consistent with the record of 
the trial. And the opportunity to amend or correct, it is the Court's ruling, is 
an opportunity to ensure consistency with the trial record, not deviate from 
the trial record based upon consideration of additional evidence which was 
not considered or presented at trial. 
Further, with respect to these particular issues, the Court notes that 
when a judgment and verdict are entered, particularly when there is a jury 
5 
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verdict entered, that any construction of the facts which may be considered 
by the Court requires the Court to construe the facts that are found, 
consistent with that judgment, and that if there are alternative constructions 
of the facts that are possible, from the facts as they are presented, the 
Court is required to construe those facts consistent with the judgment which 
was entered. 
And in this particular case, the Court's ruling with respect to the 
present motion is that, as has been demonstrated, there is evidence in the 
record of this trial, which is consistent with the determinations that were 
made. 
There is evidence in the trial in this case, of the registration of the dba 
in the names Elite Legacy and Aspenwood Real Estate. And while there 
certainly is documentation with respect to Mr. Quinlan's interest in the dba, 
the record of the trial, by acknowledgment of movant's counsel is devoid of 
any reference at all to Mr. Quinlan. And perhaps on that basis alone, it 
would be inappropriate for this Court to suggest any modification of the 
finding, to burden those findings with additional information relating to Mr. 
Quinlan, when none of that information was presented at trial. 
Those issues would be issues that may justify a new trial under Rule 
59; however that motion ls not before the Court today. 
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They may also possibly be considered under Rule 60 as alternate 
grounds for relief from judgment, but they do not form a basis for requested 
modification under Rule 52(b ). 
Further, the Court will make its ruling with respect to some of the 
questions relating to the dba. 
The Court's ruling is that a dba is an asset. It is a unique and 
intangible asset, but nonetheless it is an asset. 
The arguments of the parties have repeatedly made reference to the 
dba being owned. That is a reference to its status as an asset, an intangible 
personal property asset, and the Court rules that a dba is such an asset, and 
it can be owned. 
And a dba, like other assets, may be owned or held or transferred by 
different parties, under different circumstances, and in different capacities. 
The fact that an individual's name Is associated with a particular asset 
does not necessarily mean that it is presumptively established that all rights 
or attributes of that asset are exclusively held by the individuals in whose 
name the asset is held. 
It is possible, for example, for assets to be held in a representative 
capacity, or as agents for others. 
It is also possible for assets to be held in a somewhat segregated 
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capacity, where a legal title is held in one particular name, but equitable 
interests are actually owned by someone else. 
There has been nothing suggested in the arguments before the Court 
that some other alternative explanation of the ownership, or the listings of 
this asset in the name of Mr. Quinlan, could justify exactly the same record 
that exists, and support the findings exactly as they were found. 
There is evidence, and the evidence has even been discussed, that Mr. 
Quinlan was a principal broker for one of the business entities that was 
involved. He may very well have been acting as an agent for that business 
entity, or his name on that document may be in a representative capacity for 
that entity. 
And the Court is required again to construe the construction of facts to 
be supportive of the judgment, if such a construction is possible. And the 
Court rules, in this case, that it is. 
With respect to Mr. Quinlan, therefore, the Court finds the argument 
that simply his appearing on the initial application is conclusive of his 
ownership interest of all rights associated with that asset, from the time of 
the original application through the time of the purported assignment to, Still 
Standing Stable, is simply not a persuasive argument. 
And the circumstances of this case, in fact, suggest to the contrary 
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that he may have been simply functioning in his capacity as a participant in 
the business entity that owned the dba of Re/Max Elite, when his name was 
placed on that document. 
The Court further notes that many of the entities, Re/Max Elite being 
one, Elite Legacy being one, Aspenwood Real Estate being one, are all legal 
fictions. They are not tangible entities. They are not living and breathing. 
They exist as a bundle of legal rights. 
And they may represent individuals, they may represent associations 
of individuals, they could be represented or effectively owned or controlled 
by joint ventures or by partnerships. A general partnership can be 
established by an oral agreement, as can a joint venture. 
And all of those are possibilities that could explain the particular name 
as it appears on the original application, and be entirely consistent with the 
determinations which had previously been made, and the findings of the 
Court; and therefore, the Court rules that there has not been a sufficient 
showing to justify a modification of the findings as they relate to the 
ownership of the dba. 
Further, there has been a request for modification of the findings as it 
relates to Mr. Skip Wing, based upon his articulation in various statements 
that he did not individually own or control the rights that were being 
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asserted in the litigation. 
That particular position is not disputed, either in the testimony of Mr. 
Wing or in the arguments of plaintiff's counsel, and the Court believes that it 
is appropriate to make a clarification and modification to the existing rulings 
with respect to that issue. 
And that clarification will be that, to the extent that Skip Wing is 
identified as a party in these proceedings, or as the holder of any claims., 
that identification is Mr. Skip Wing, in his representative capacity, as 
principal broker for the brokerage, or as an agent or representative of the 
brokerage, and does not represent his individual and personal ownership of 
those claims. 
So the Court is not going to modify the findings to the extent of 
excluding his name, but will include the modification that to the extent that 
his name is included, that is a representation of his role in connection with 
the business entity, and that that role was the role of principal broker, 
representative, agent, or authorized representative of the brokerage. 
And that clarification will be made, to avoid any conclusion that the 
claims that are identified are individually and separately owned by Mr. Wing, 
independent of his role in connection with the business entity, and that 
modification will be approved. 
10 
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Excerpt from ~ uling and. Order o°' Defendants' Rule 6Q(b) Motion 








made previous rulings on those issues, and those rulings are not going to be 
disturbed by the Court today. There is evidence that is even before the 
Court today, including the record of the Department of Corporations, that 
shows Legacy Elite as a registered owner of the dba during particular time 
periods. There is documentation that shows Aspenwood Real Estate, either 
as an LLC or as a corporation, as a registered owner of the dba at various 
time. There are documents which purport to assign the dba between those 
entities. There is a document, purportedly signed by Mr. Quinlan, that 
purports to transfer whatever interest he may have had, whether that was a 
bare legal title to the dba that was equitably owned by the corporation 
already, or whether it was something else. That kind of information is not 
before the Court. But to be consistent with the prior rulings, the Court's 
ruling today is that the evidence is sufficient to maintain all of the prior 
rulings of the Court with respect to the issues of standing and ownership of 
the dba, and those rulings will not be disturbed. The suggestion that all of 
the documentation now produced, and the arguments now being made, that 
Mr. Quinlan, in fact, has at all times been the real party in interest, and is 
the only party that has the right to proceed, are simply not persuasive. 
The Court's observation of this case, from the review of the 
proceedings up to the point of trial and then during the post-trial process, is 
11 
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that this issue of Mr. Quinlan's ownership of the dba, and his derivative right 
therefore to effectively control these claims or to transfer them, assign 
them, or compromise them, is a construct, all of which has occurred after 
trial. And it is a construct which is based, to a large extent, on a letter, 
December 11th, 2013, that the Court has previously made reference to, 
which appears to be a deviation from any recognized practice of the 
Department of Commerce. It presupposes findings with respect to issues of 
forgery, or cutting and pasting of documents. None of those issues have 
ever been presented on an evidentiary basis to the Court, and the Court, in 
light of both the timing of its presentation, the fact that Mr. Quinlan's 
involvement, both in the business entity and in the registration of the dba, is 
a matter of public record that has existed for many years, and questions that 
the Court has raised with respect to these documents, the Court will simply 
not countenance the legal argument that Mr. Quinlan is effectively the 
superseding entity with respect to these claims, and that argument is not 
given further legal consideration by the Court. 
Similarly, the argument with respect to the necessity that the Court 
determine that the judgment is void because of failure to comply with the 
requirements of mediation, while there have been suggestions that specific 
requirements of the mediation rules or statutes may not have technically 
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been complied with, there's been no indication that there was any objection 
made at the time, or that these issues were even raised until they have now 
come up, well after trial, well after the conclusion of that mediation. And 
again, based upon a construct to some extent which superimposes Mr. 
Quinlan's purported rights into that process, suggesting that the failure of 
his participation may also necessarily constitute a failure of the legal 
sufficiency of the mediation, the Court simply will not consider those 
arguments, based upon the analysis which has previously been made. And 
the record before the Court is that a mediation was ordered, and that a 
mediation was conducted. Whether there were technical deficiencies in that 
mediation, to this Court's knowledge, they weren't ever brought to the 
Court's attention in a manner that would have permitted the Court to 
address deficiencies with respect to the mediation, or, at the time, that 
would have permitted the parties to also address those particular issues.-
There has been nothing argued to the Court on those points, and the 
Court rules that the argument with respect to the insufficiency of the 
mediation is not persuasive; therefore, the Court's ruling is that the asserted 
grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), that the judgment itself is void, are 
not weH taken. That objection to the form of the judgment is overruled, and 
the motion for relief denied. And I believe that is all of the issues that were 
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EXHIBITE 
Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants ' Stipulated Motion to 
Release Bond (fifth ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence) 
The Court denies the motion, which is a purported stipulated motion to 
release the bond or approve the settlement. 
And the basis of the Court's ruling is that the purported stipulation 
does not properly identify the parties holding the judgment. 
There have been significant steps taken by the defendant in this case 
to construct an alternative set of facts which would give Mr. Quinlan certain 
rights under this judgment and purport to assign those rights to him. None 
of those have been established properly by the Court, and the findings which 
were previously made by the Court as to the holders of the claim remain 
undisturbed. And therefore, Mr. Quinlan does not have authority to act on 
behalf of the holders of the claim, based upon the Court's denying the 
request to modify the prior rulings, and therefore is not a proper party with 
authority to stipulate on issues relating to the bond or any other disposition 
of the claim. And so that motion is denied. 
ORDER 
Based upon the Court's Rulings, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
1. The Rule 52(b) Motion is denied with respect to Defendants' 
attempt to introduce the Dale Quinlan dba evidence post-trial, as 
there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new evidence. The 
policy underlying Rule 52 is to make sure that the findings and 
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Ruling and Order on Defendants ' Rule 25(c) Motion 
(sixth and final ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence) 
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The Order of Court is stated below: :/··\:::·\;/:: 
Dated: December 29, 2014 Isl Noels'! Hydit}:./'.' 
01 :33:01 PM District:C§w-.t' Judge 
• ._:.:;:.:,:. ~- .. ~~:••)•l 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
Hilary "Skip" Wing, et al, 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
Still Standing Stables, L.C., et al. 
Defendants. 
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Ruling and Order on November 24, 2014 Hearing of Defendants' Rule 25(c) Motion 
Civil No. 060906802 
Honorable Noel S. Hyde 
On November 24. 2014, the Honorable Noel S. Hyde held a hearing on Defendants' Rule 
25(c) Motion. Dallin T. Morrow of LeBaron & Jensen, P.C. appeared for the Plaintiffs; Robert J. 
Fuller appeared for Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt and Still Standing Stables, L.C.; and Karra J. 
Porter appeared for Third-Party Defendant Cathy Code. 
Ruling 
Defendants' Rule 25(c) Motion raises an issue essentially identical to an issue that the 
Defendants have raised previously, i.e. the claim that Still Standing Stables, as the asserted current 
owner of the dba "Remax Elite," either by assignment from Dale Quinlan or by separate 
administrative determination by the Department of Corporations, owns the right to control the 
judgment in this case. Jn past hearings, the court has ruled that the evidence and arguments 
supporting these assertions of Still Standing Stables were not timely brought in this case and are not 
now properly before the court. 
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The court declines to modify its earlier rulings. As a result, the court rules that Still Standing 
Stables' ownership or control of the judgment has not been established, and that the requested 
substitution under Rule 25(c) is not appropriate. 
Order 
Based upon the court's ruling, the court orders that Defendants' motion under Rule 25(c) is 
denied. 
--END OF ORDER----------------
In accordance with the Utah State District Courts Efiling Standard No. 4, and URCP Rule 
lO(e), this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an 
electronic signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was submitted for electronic 
filing, and was thus sent to all counsel of record by email: 
Robert R. Wallace 
Kirton McConkie 
60 East South Temple# l 800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0 l 20 
Robert J. Fuller 
I 090 No1th 5900 East 
Eden, Utah 84310 
Karra J. Porter 
Sarah E. Spencer 
Christensen & Jensen, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Scott R. Edgar 
1379 North I 075 West, Suite 226 
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@ Farmington, Utah 84025 
@ 011 this_ day of December 2014. 
/s/ Jessica Ritchie 
3 
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